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PERSPECTIVES ON MARKET SHARE LIABILITY:




Few cases have created a stir as dramatic as the case of Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories.' It has been variously described as "a blockbuster," ' 2 a "novel and
unprecedented case," 3 and "a radical departure from the body of products liability
law." 4 The judgment of dissenting judge Richardson that the case "represent[ed]
a new high watermark in tort law" 5 for plaintiffs seemed difficult to dispute. Cali-
fornia, a state which pioneered product liability ideas which theoretically permitted
recovery without a showing of manufacturer fault, had again apparently blazed
an electrifying and revolutionary trail of product liability compensation. 6
However, the market share theory of recovery enunciated in Sindell has met
with less than an enthusiastic response in other courts.7 The fairness, efficiency,
* Associate Professor of Law, Drake University; B.A., University of Missouri-Kansas City, 1973;
J.D., University of Missouri-Kansas City, 1976; LL.M, University of Michigan, 1979.
** Assistant Professor of Economics, Drake University; B.A., Indiana University, 1977; Ph D.,
Purdue University, 1983.
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924, cert. denied,
449 U.S. 912 (1980).
2 PRODucTs LIABILITY INSTITUTE: THE TRIAL OF A PRODUCT LIABILITY CASE, at 1-2 (V. Walkowiak
ed. 1981).
Note, California Expands Tort Liability Under the Novel "Market Share" Theory: Sindell
v. Abbott Laboratories, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1011 (1981).
' Mizell v. Eli Lilly, 526 F. Supp. 589, 596 (D. S.C. 1981). See also Bichler and Sindell: Generic
Drug Products and Liability Without Causation, 33 FED'N OF INS. COUNSEL Q. 315, 335 (1983).
Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 614, 163 Cal. Rptr. 146, 607 P.2d at 938.
6 California's role in the development of strict liability principles goes back at least as far as
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944), and Justice Roger Traynor's
concurring opinion. In his opinion, Traynor spoke of a new theory of recovery. "In my opinion, it
should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article he has placed
on the market, knowing it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury
to human beings." Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 461, 150 P.2d at 440.
Nearly twenty years later, the spirit of Justice Traynor's concurrence became the opinion of
the California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963). Rather than titling this theory "absolute liability" as he had done in Escola,
Traynor attached the more modest name "strict liability." "The purpose of such liability is to insure
that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves."
Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377 P.2d at 901.
California has continued to play a leading role in efforts to actualize the promise of strict liability
through such means as shifting burdens of proof to defendants and jury instructions favorable to a
plaintiff. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443 (1978)
and Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153 (1972).
' See, e.g., Mizell, 526 F. Supp. 589, Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 F. Supp. 593 (M.D.
Fla. 1982); Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 533 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Payton v.
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and workability of the market share theory as a proxy for the traditional iden-
tification requirement in a products liability case have been questioned by those
courts and by commentators.8 Its potential for application in non-pharmaceutical
contexts has either been ambiguously realized9 or merely proposed.'0 Nevertheless,
it is in the pharmaceutical field that Sindell arose, and it is the pharmaceutical
field which promises to yield additional scores of cases where market share theories
are advanced to attempt to secure recovery for persons allegedly injured by dangerous
generic drugs."
After setting out more fully the nature of the identification problem, this article
will examine some of the perceived shortcomings of the market share theory, as
well as the continuing judicial reception of Sindell. This judicial reception includes
recent efforts to accept in principle but modify in application the holding of that
case. More importantly, the case has been vigorously attacked as substantially
dampening the incentive of drug companies to engage in research and development
for new drugs. 2 If this were so, it would have a pervasive and deleterious effect
on society. This objection has been overstated, however, and courts should not
regard it as a serious impediment to an application of the market share theory
in these Sindell-like settings. Furthermore, some of the other uncertainties of Sindell
Abbott Laboratories, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d
241 (Mo. 1984).
' See infra text accompanying notes 43-63.
' The most controversial application of market share principles has been in the context of asbestos
cases. At least two courts have to varying extends upheld the application of market share principles
against asbestos manufacturers. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D.
Tex. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982); Copeland v. Celotex Corp., 447
So. 2d 908 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Contra In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152 (N.D.
Cal. 1982) (market share liability rejected because of inherent difficulties in ascertaining accurate divi-
sion along market share lines).
,o One action presently in litigation involves the proposed application of market share principles
to electrical wiring manufacturers who incorporate polyvinyl chloride (PVC) into wiring. PVC is pur-
chased by wiring manufacturers in base form. They then use this insulation on the wiring. PVC is
a chemical component produced by many manufacturers and the identification of the producer of PVC
is impossible. Allegedly, PVC when exposed to heat suffers a spontaneous breakdown of its properties.
Gases are emitted and a concentration of gas and heat result, producing a low level explosion. Then
a white gas is given off and reduced to carbon gas. This noxious gas causes a relaxation of the traches
and an inhalation of black smoke which immobilizes the victim. PVC is used widely in electrical wiring.
Because identification is not possible, plaintiffs seek to have market share principles applied to the
defendants. A jury has held that the insulation contributed to the spread of the fire, but the other
issues of defectiveness and damages await separate trial. At the time this article was completed, only
one defendant remained in the case, as settlements with all others were effected. Interview with Thomas
Zurek, an attorney for plaintiff (June 8, 1984).
1 Drugs are generally equivalent when the active ingredient in each is described by the same
chemical formula. Nevertheless, they may not be therapeutically equivalent because of differences in
inert ingredients which constitute the major part of the total weight of the drug in most cases and
in certain physical characteristics of the active ingredient, including solubility and crystalline structure.
See D. Scnw~a Nrzi, INNovATIoN IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDusTRY 213 (1977).
" See, e.g., Payton, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 and infra text accompanying notes 51-58.
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MARKET SHARE LIABILITY
are solvable by continued judicial refinement of the terms of that decision. While
a complete rehabilitation of this much-criticized case is improbable, Sindell remains
as the respectable germinal effort to treat the vexing identification roadblock which
infects these generic pharmaceutical cases. Given the almost inevitable filing of many
more cases in this field,' 3 and the substantial criticism of the market share approach,
a fresh look at this liability and damage allocation theory is warranted.
II. SINDELL: THE GENEsIs OF MARKET SHARE LIAILITY
A. DES Daughters
The problem presented by so-called generic drugs is most dramatically
demonstrated in the Sindell case itself. Plaintiff Judith Sindell brought an individual
and class action against eleven drug companies which allegedly manufactured,
promoted, and sold diethylstilbestrol (DES), a synthetic form of the female hor-
mone estrogen.' 4 She claimed that DES was ingested by her mother and the mothers
of those represented by the class. DES had been approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in 1947 for use as an anti-miscarriage drug.'I Between 1947
and 1971, a large number of manufacturers produced and marketed DES, and
apparently millions of pregnant women had the drug prescribed for them.' 6 In 1971,
the FDA forbade the sale or promotion of DES because it was unsafe and ineffec-
tive as a preventor of miscarriages. 7 Statistics showed a frightening correlation
between users of DES and the development of cancerous and precancerous vaginal
growths in the daughters of users. The complaint in Sindell graphically demonstrated
the horrors faced by daughters of DES users:
DES may cause cancerous vaginal and cervical growths in the daughters exposed
to it before birth, because their mothers took the drug during pregnancy. The form
of cancer from which these daughters suffer is known as adenocarcinoma, and
it manifests itself after a minimum latent period of 10 or 12 years. It is a fast-
' The estimates of the numbers of "DES daughters" who might suffer from adverse consequences
of their mothers ingesting DES during pregnancy ranges from 500,000 to 3,000,000. See Comment,
Overcoming the identification Burden in DES Litigation: The Market Share Liability Theory, 65 MARQ.
L. REV. 609, 612 (1982).
" Synthetic estrogens were desirable because of the high cost and impractical side effects of ad-
ministering natural estrogen. For a detailed narration of the facts behind the synthesis of DES, its
resulting development, marketing, and ultimate removal from the market for anti-miscarriage purposes,
see Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, cert denied, E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc. v. Abel, 105 S. Ct. 123
(1984). It should be noted that DES does have other uses, even now. It is approved for use as an
estrogen replacement for cases of hormone deficiency, for treatment of symptoms of menopause and
some forms of cancer, to suppress lactation, and as the primary ingredient of a post-coital contracep-
tive, see Ferrigno, 175 N.J. Super. at 565, 420 A.2d at 1312.
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spreading and deadly disease, and radical surgery is required to prevent it from
spreading. DES also causes adenosis, precancerous vaginal and cervical growths
which may spread to other areas of the body. The treatment for adenosis is cauteriza-
tion, surgery, or cryosurgery. Women who suffer from this condition must be
monitored by biopsy or colposcopic examination twice a year, a painful and expen-
sive procedure. Thousands of women whose mothers received DES during pregnancy
are unaware of the effects of the drug."8
Numerous suits on behalf of DES daughters were brought against DES manufac-
turers, with the strong prospect of many future claims.' 9 The problems represented
by such actions are manifold, ranging from a possible statute of limitations bar
to rules restricting recovery for injuries inflicted on pre-viable fetuses.20 Most
insidious, however, is an impediment presented by DES in its form as a generic
product, that of identification. That is, because DES was produced from a com-
mon formula and is a fungible, interchangeable drug, prescriptions were filled from
whatever stock a pharmacist had available, irrespective of the brand names of DES
specified on a prescription blank.2' Consequently, even if such records had been
retained by the pharmacist involved (an unlikely prospect given the substantial period
of time spanned), the accuracy of such records was open to question. In short,
while the plaintiff could perhaps identify the defective product, she could not iden-
tify the specific producer of the specific DES ingested by her mother. It is with
this background that the California Supreme Court faced the identification issue.
B. Identification as a Roadblock
The so-called identification requirement in a products liability case, in most
instances, serves useful, necessary ends. In a doctrinal sense, it fits comfortably
within the framework of a torts negligence case.22 In order to shift a loss to a
defendant, a plaintiff must not-only establish that the defendant breached a duty
to use reasonable care to produce a safe drug and that the plaintiff suffered damage,
the plaintiff must also prove that the defendant's conduct caused her injury. Her
means of doing this is by identifying the defendant as the maker or party otherwise
responsible for the injury-producing item. In Sindell, however, the plaintiff claimed
that a mechanical application of the identification rule would be inequitable. She
"Ifd.
" See supra note 13.
20 See Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAm L. REv. 963,
968-71 (1978).
, Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 595, 163 Cal. Rptr at 134, 607 P.2d at 926.
12 Conventional common-law doctrine states the four elements of a negligence case to be a duty
to conform one's conduct to a certain standard of care to protect others against unreasonable risks,
a breach of that duty, a reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the plaintiff's
injury, and actual injury or damage to plaintiff. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS at 164-65 (W.
Keeton 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON]. The identification requirement is a part
of causation. By showing the defendant is responsible for the particular injury producing agent, the
plaintiff demonstrates a causal link between the defendant's product or conduct and the plaintiff's injury.
[Vol. 88
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offered three bases upon which to invoke an exception. History has proven that
these exceptions have not enjoyed great success in the courts and hold only modest
promise for the future.
First considered and rejected by the California Supreme Court was the "alter-
native liability" theory, most famously illustrated by Summers v. Tice. 3 In Sum-
mers, two hunters negligently discharged their weapons at a point close to plain-
tiff. It could not be determined, however, which of the two negligent hunters actually
caused the injury. Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court imposed liability
jointly and severally on the hunters, reasoning that as between two negligent defen-
dants and an innocent plaintiff, the difficult if not impossible burden of establishing
causation should be borne by the defendants." The Sindell court declined, however,
to apply Summers to the facts before it. Rejecting any requirement that a defen-
dant had to be in a better position to ascertain the causation issue in order for
Summers to apply,25 the court nevertheless perceived a significant difference be-
tween the two situations. "There, all the parties who were or could have been respon-
sible for the harm to the plaintiff were joined as defendants. Here, by contrast,
there are approximately 200 drug companies which made DES, any of which might
have manufactured the injury-producing drug."26
Evidently, the significant disparity in odds of one in two (Summers) versus
the apparent one in two hundred situation in Sindell was too much for the court
to accept. A strict application of the alternative liability principle was rejected.
As the court notes, and history has recorded, an "adaptation" of the Summers
rule was ultimately adopted by the court.
Next considered and discarded in Sindell was the "concert of action" theory.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had acted jointly to formulate, produce,
and market DES without adequate warning. Such a finding would result in the
imposition of liability on all parties to the conspiracy, making them joint and several
tortfeasors in the strict, traditional common law sense.27 However, the court in
Sindell found at most the type of imitative conduct on the manufacturers' part
that is customarily engaged in by members of many industries. This type of behavior
23 Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
+ Id. at 88, 199 P.2d at 5.
2, Defendants claimed that in order to invoke any burden shifting rule, plaintiff must show they
had better access to information regarding the cause of the injury. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 600, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 137-38, 607 P.2d at 929-30.
2I Id. at 603, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139, 607 P.2d at 931.
2, The advantages of the concert of action theory are several. First, a plaintiff can sue any one
party participating in the concerted action rather than having to take on an entire industry. Second,
no problems with allocation of market shares exist. Perhaps most importantly, even if a defendant
can establish it didn't produce the actual injury-producing drug, liability can still attach if the showing
of concerted action is made. See LaMarca, Market Share Liability, Industry- Wide Liability, Alternative
Liability and Concert of Action: Modern Legal Concepts Preserving Liability for Defective but Uniden-
tifiable Products, 31 DaAKE L. Rav. 61, 66-67 (1982).
1985]
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fell far short of the "common plan" or "tacit understanding" requirements which
serve as the underpinning of liability in concert of action cases.28 To impose liability
in such a situation would be to condemn conduct outside that which the common
law sought to proscribe.
The final somewhat conventional theory advanced by the plaintiff has been
dubbed "enterprise" or "industry-wide" liability. It can be traced at least as far
back as the case of Hall v. E.L DuPont de Nemours29 in 1972. The defendants
were blasting cap manufacturers which together occupied almost completely the
blasting cap market in the United States. The defendants had formed a trade associa-
tion, also a named defendant, to which matters of safety had been delegated. The
association was also responsible for issues of design and labeling. Because of this
delegation, the court in Hall thought it warranted to impose liability on the defen-
dants jointly, or at least to shift the burden of proof to the defendants, so long
as the plaintiffs could establish that the caps were made by one of the defendants.
As in Sindell, the plaintiffs had an identification problem due to the nature of
the product.3" The blasting caps which had allegedly caused a number of accidents
were not retrievable to aid in identification.
As with the two theories previously noted, however, the California Supreme
Court rejected application of the enterprise approach. In addition to the fact that
there was no delegation of safety to a trade association in Sindell, the numbers
game again worked against plaintiffs. "At least 200 manufacturers produced DES;
Hall, which involved 6 manufacturers representing the entire blasting cap industry
in the United States, cautioned against application of the doctrine espoused therein
to a large number of producers." 3'
As the court refused to adopt any of the three proferred approaches, the plain-
tiffs in Sindell had apparently struck out. But the court perceived several substan-
tial reasons not to be hidebound by strict doctrinal considerations. Drawing upon
Justice Traynor's opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 32 the court noted
a need "in an era of mass production and complex marketing methods," for an
"adaptation of the rules of causation and liability." 33 Traynor's concurrence in
Escola represents one of the classic expositions of the conventional wisdom respect-
ing strict products liability. Emphasizing the growing technological complexity and
the inability of consumers to deal knowledgeably with the products, Traynor per-
ceived a need for a change in product liability rules tied to fault. The majority
opinion in Sindell embellished this theme by holding that where these products which
28 Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 605, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41, 607 P.2d at 932-33.
29 Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
30 The court in Hall noted that in most instances the manufacturer of the blasting cap was unknown.
Id. at 358.
Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143, 607 P.2d at 935.
' Escola, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436.
" Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144, 607 P.2d at 936.
[Vol. 88
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cause injury are unidentifiable, conventional doctrine must flex so injured con-
sumers do not go uncompensated.
3 4
The other reason cited by the court which dictated a relaxation of conventional
tort doctrine is a familiar one to products liability cases. The loss is shifted from
plaintiff to defendant, held the court, because the plaintiff is innocent, the defen-
dant negligent, and imposing liability on the defendant will encourage it to expend
more time, money, and effort on safety considerations.3 5 These factors when taken
together, especially in the context of pharmaceuticals where a consumer's ignorance
of the properties of the product involved is greatest, 36 served as the court's justifica-
tion for turning to the profoundly controversial means of allocating liability accord-
ing to market shares. 3
7
Despite the enormous debate engendered by the Sindell case, the court's
explication of the market share theory itself is startling brief. Stated another way,
perhaps because the court's explication of the theory is so brief, the enormous debate
was thereby created. The essence of the court's holding can be stated best in the
court's words:
We hold it to be reasonable in the present context to measure the likelihood that
any of the defendants supplied the product which allegedly injured plaintiff by
the percentage which the DES sold by each of them for the purpose of preventing
miscarriage bears to the entire production of the drug sold by all for that purpose.
Plaintiff asserts in her briefs that Eli Lilly and Company and 5 or 6 other com-
panies produced 90 percent of the DES marketed. If at trial this is established to
be the fact, then there is a corresponding likelihood that this comparative handful
of producers manufactured the DES which caused plaintiff's injuries, and only
a 10 percent likelihood that the offending producer would escape liability. 8
The plaintiff must join manufacturers of a "substantial percentage" of the
DES, the court held, though what constituted such a substantial percentage was
unspecified. 9 Manufacturers sued then could join other DES manufacturers not
originally named as parties. The respective market shares would then serve as the
basis for apportioning damages among the defendants. The court dismissed any
"minor" discrepancies between market shares and the liability imposed as "in-
evitable" and not anything which would "seriously militate against the rule" of
market share liability."' Furthermore, if a particular defendant could establish that
it couldn't possibly have produced the offending drug, it would be dismissed from
34 Id.
11 Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441.
"1 Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144, 607 P.2d at 936.
37 Id.
11 Id. at 611-12, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145, 607 P.2d at 937.
11 Id. The court rejected the suggestion that 75 or 80% be used as the required percentage. This
suggestion had been proposed in Comment, supra note 20.
,0 Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145, 607 P.2d at 937.
1985]
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the case." Finally, the court acknowledged the existence of "practical problems"
in determining the relevant market and assigning market shares but considered these
to be problems solvable at the trial and not the pleading stage of the case.4
The opinion of the court was not lengthy. Its tenor was not one seeming to
signal a great change in tort law. If the court thought the opinion would go unnoticed
by the legal community however, it was certainly mistaken.
III. SINDELL AND ITS CRITICS
The critical commentary on Sindell has in most instances been unkind, or at
least unfavorable. 3 The criticism of the market share approach has been on several
counts. A commonly cited fault of the Sindell opinion is the absence of attention
to the operational details of the new theory of recovery. Though it may be, as
the court asserts, reasonable to measure the likelihood any defendant made the
particular offending drug by the percentage of the DES market occupied, other
questions remain. What is the relevant geographic market for example? If the total
amount of DES a woman ingested came from the pharmacies of a particular city,
or perhaps from a single pharmacy, would market shares be calculated on the basis
of what market shares a manufacturer had within that city, or even within that
single pharmacy? The court does not tell us. The market share approach assumes
that the records which would establish such market shares have been kept by
manufacturers, wholesalers, or individual pharmacists. This is a doubtful assump-
tion for any party in the chain of distribution, especially for a small pharmacy.
The spirit of Sindell suggests that if there is uncertainty regarding market por-
tions, each defendant company, and not the plaintiff, would bear the responsibility
to establish its market share. This is consistent with some readings of Summers
v. Tice and with the view many courts take of res ipsa loquitur." Nevertheless,
Sindell supplies no clue as to how this important matter is to be resolved. There
is also some question as to how accurately courts could compute these market shares
literally at the individual retail level. A larger relevant geographical market would
41 Id.
42 Id.
" Sindell generated considerable commentary. See, e.g., Newcomb, Market Share Liability for
Defective Products: An ill Advised Remedy for the Problem of Identification, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 300
(1981); Fischer, Products Liability-An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1623
(1981); Comment, Market Share Liability: A Plea for Legislative Altervatives, 1982 U. ILL. L. F. 1003
Comment, supra note 13; Note, Market Share Liability, for DES (Diethylstilbestrol) Injury: A New
High Water Mark in Tort Law, 60 NEB. L. Rav. 432 (1981).
4 In fact, there was little in Summers v. Tice to suggest the defendants would be in any better
position than the plaintiff to determine which of them caused the injury. Nevertheless, the burden of
proof was shifted to the defendants, in essence making them joint tortfeasors. Though not viewed as
an element of the res ipsa theory, one view of its function is to place responsibility on a defendant
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be more capable of efficient judicial administration, but it is apparent that, as the
relevant geographic market becomes larger, the correspondence between market
share and likelihood that a particular manufacturer produced the particular offen-
ding drug becomes more tenuous. Further, the absence of explanation from the
Sindell court on these points would permit market shares for a particular drug to
vary according to the evidence the parties, or more likely the manufacturers, could
adduce. Because this would vary from case to case, it is unlikely that a reasonably
fair apportionment of liability based on market shares could be achieved over the
course of many cases.
To claim, as the court did in Sindell, that these are "largely matters of proof
which properly cannot be determined at the pleading stage"' ' is simply incorrect.
While not every "i" need be dotted nor "t" crossed when a court announces a
new basis of recovery, a reasonable elaboration of the elements of that theory should
be supplied. Critics claim that leaving such issues to the proof stage of succeeding
trials provides no guidance to future litigants to know how to structure their cases.
This is not a wise use of judicial resources and increases the litigation costs to
all parties. Sindell, then, has been an easy target for criticism given its failure to
illuminate these and other aspects of the relevant market problem.""
Aside from that specific deficiency, there are still other shortcomings stem-
ming largely from the terseness of the court's opinion. For example, by making
defendant-manufacturers responsible for proving their respective percentages of the
relevant market, 7 did the court mean a percentage of the relevant market possessed
only by the named defendants in a case? Or did the court mean a percentage of
the total relevant market, whether or not all manufacturers in the market were
parties in the case?
The court in Sindell held that the plaintiff need only bring a substantial percent-
age of the relevant market into the case. Defendants are then free to join other
"market-sharing" manufacturers, subject of course to the circumscriptions of
jurisdiction and service principles inherent in civil litigation. Nevertheless, the
likelihood that one hundred percent of the market would be represented in a par-
ticular case is remote. The tenor of Sindell,"8 if little else, suggests the defendants
would have to pay one hundred percent of the plaintiff's damages even if one hun-
dred percent of the market was not represented in the suit.49
4' Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 614, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146, 607 P.2d at 938.
46 Another criticism of Sindell is its failure to specify how the market for DES can be allocated
fairly when DES has been prescribed for uses other than as a miscarriage preventative. Moreover, Sindell
did not make clear whether it was the defendant's burden to establish market shares.
" Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145, 608 P.2d at 937.
4S At least one court has suggested, however, that by bringing into the case less than 100% of
the relevant market, the plaintiff is correspondingly limited to a deduction from the damages she can
recover. Copeland, 447 So. 2d 908.
" For example, assume a plaintiff proves damages of one million dollars. Assume also that X
Company occupied twenty percent of the total relevant market. Further assume that only 70%7o of the
1985]
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Imposing liability based on a manufacturer's share of the appropriate relevant
market in generic drug cases is premised on the excusable inability of a plaintiff
to identify the producer of the particular offending drug." As has been noted,
however, this may provide an incentive for plaintiffs to remain ignorant of the
manufacturer's identity. In knowing who the manufacturer is and bringing suit
only against it, a plaintiff is running the risk of encountering potential jurisdiction
and service problems or, the even crueler fate, insolvency. By remaining ignorant,
plaintiff will have the opportunity to look to other manufacturers under the market
share arrangement. If courts were to apply the traditional principles of joint and
several liability to such cases, the damages unrecoverable from one defendant would
be picked up by another. Legal rules according more favorable treatment to the
ignorant may have a salutary purpose, but the costs associated with such a policy
must also be taken into account by the courts.
An underlying premise of Sindell is that it is fair to shift liability onto defen-
dants who not only marketed a product which was dangerous but who can better
stand to bear the cost of such injuries. One wonders, however, about this fairness
rationale in light of the rather chilly reception accorded Sindell in other states.
If the market share theory is fair because of its diffuse allocation of liability, it
is certainly not a fair result when only manufacturers subject to suit and process
in California and a few other states are subject to its application. Until more states
adopt the market share approach, this jurisdictional limitation will punish defen-
dants amenable to suit in those states recognizing the theory. This distorts the market
share distribution of liability and seriously undercuts the fairness rationale of Sindell.
Finally, one other argument criticizing the market share theory is difficult to
assess. The claim is made that expansive liability doctrines such as espoused in
Sindell have sufficiently mobilized defendant-insurance and manufacturing interests
to lead them to press for national product liability legislation. Certainly a recent
session of Congress came closer to adopting nationalized legislation than any other.I'
Such legislative thrusts do not augur favorable times for plaintiffs. Though the
effect of Sindell in this respect should not be overstated, if it can be evaluated
at all, one can be certain that it has not gone unnoticed. In pressing their case
of the necessity of such legislation, however, drug manufacturers no doubt would
relevant market was joined. Under Sindell, the X Company would be liable for $285,000 of the award
although its market share was only 20%.
SO The court in Sindell also emphasized that by holding the defendants liable for defective prod-
ucts, safety incentives are promoted. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145, 607 P.2d at 937.
" The Kasten bill (S.44) of the 98th Congress would have set national standards for product
liability cases which would have preempted state law to the contrary. The bill was reported to the Senate
without any recommendation by the Labor and Human Resources Committee. The bill was not debated
on the Senate floor before adjournment and it died. There was an amendment proposed by the Com-
merce Committee in the Senate whereby a three member panel would "study the need for federal legisla-
tion" which would provide compensation to claimants who are unable to recover damages because
the manufacturer of the product could not be identified. The amendment died with the bill.
[Vol. 88
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advance the following: "Holding manufacturers liable for accidents for which they
are in no way responsible, merely because they sold the same product, offends
the notion that liability must bear some connection to responsibility." 52
IV. JuDiciAL RECEPTION OF SINDELL
A. Sindell Rejected by Some Courts
It is fair to say that courts in other jurisdictions have not embraced Sindell
with open arms. In fact, the judicial response to the new market share concept
has been underwhelming. Representative of the judicial antipathy to Sindell is Payton
v. Abbott Labs,5 3 a case where a class of approximately 4,000 DES daughters sought
to invoke a market share theory of recovery against six manufacturers of DES.
The plaintiffs, in addition to seeking to have liability "apportioned among named
defendant's share of the DES distributed by all named defendants, '54 sought to
expand the Sindell rationale. Sindell permits a manufacturer to escape liability by
proving it could not possibly have produced the particular DES which injured a
plaintiff. This could be done, presumably, by a defendant establishing it did not
distribute DES at the time of the pregnancy of a plaintiff's mother, or that it did
not distribute DES in the relevant geographic market. The plaintiffs in Payton,
however, sought to prevent defendants from adducing any such exculpatory evidence.
In answering certified questions of law, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts rejected the application of Summers v. Tice or Sindell to these facts.
Summers, the court stated, required all negligent parties who might have caused
the injury to be before the court; only six DES distributors were named in Payton.
This created the risk that the named defendants would be held liable "for more
harm than they caused." Because of this, one purpose of the traditional identifica-
tion requirement in a products liability case, that wrongdoers are held liable only
for the harm they have caused, is disserved. Moreover, in seeking to prohibit ex-
culpatory proof, the plaintiffs would frustrate the other purpose served by iden-
tification, separating wrongdoers from innocent actors. But in rejecting the plain-
tiffs' effort to impose market share liability, the court noted a consideration ignored
in Sindell, and explored in this article. If the plaintiffs' theory were accepted, reason-
ed the court, and the defendants were held liable for injuries caused by the negligence
of others, research and development in the drug industry could suffer. This would
be so especially with generic drugs. Such a result would violate the public policy
favoring the discovery of new and efficacious drugs, a policy reflected in Comment
K to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,"5 wherein a negligence standard is prescribed
52 Newcomb, supra, note 43 at 327.
" Payton, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171.
Id. at 572, 437 N.E.2d at 189.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment K states:
K. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state of
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for drug-related product injuries. 6 As the court stated, "if a cure for clear-cell
adenocarcinoma lies in the development and manufacture of some new drug,
imposing market share liability might prevent the marketing of a cure for the very
cancer threatening the plaintiffs." '"1
The court in Payton did not discuss whether the plaintiffs had joined a substan-
tial percentage of the DES market, though the court stated "the plaintiffs would
have us assume that these six defendants were responsible for all the DES
distributed" in the relevant geographic market. This market was stated to be the
total Massachusetts market for DES use in pregnancy. Perhaps the court did not
examine the relevant market issue more closely because it was unprepared to accept
market share liability in any respect. Certainly a careful plaintiff would not lightly
ask a court to assume that a group of defendants represented one hundred percent
of the relevant market, though, of course, Sindell requires only that a substantial
percentage of the market be joined. Perhaps the plaintiffs were in fact claiming
that a substantial percentage of the market was before the court, leaving those
defendants free to bring in other manufacturers. Such being the case, the plaintiffs
might have claimed that they were entitled to recover one hundred percent of their
damages. Still, it seems in Payton that deficiencies in the plaintiffs' case played
a substantial role in the court's decision, for the market share door was left ajar.
human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary
use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine
for the Pasteur treatmen of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damag-
ing consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful
death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the
unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and
accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which
for this very reason cahinot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription
of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which,
because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no
assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there
is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk.
The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and
marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held
to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has
undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended
with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
'" The court in Payton does not address the contention that because DES was not "accompanied by
... warning" it should not reap the benefit of being free from strict liability treatment under RESTATE-
MT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A. In Sindell and, presumably, many other DES cases plaintiffs will
not advance as a primary theory strict liability. Sindell, for example, included claims that the defen-
dants during the period they marketed DES knew or should have known that it was carcinogenic. This
is obviously a negligence theory at work.
" Payton, 386 Mass. at 574, 437 N.E.2d at 190 n.18. See also Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116
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That is not to say that on an adequate record this court would not recognize some
relaxation of the traditional identification requirement in appropriate circumstances
so as to allow recovery against a negligent defendant of that portion of a plaintiff's
damages which is represented by defendant's contribution of DES to the market
in the relevant period of time.-
Whether the "appropriate circumstances" on an adequate record would overcome
the court's reservations relating to dampening the development of new drugs is
uncertain. However, this very real social cost, ignored in Sindell, is at least addressed
by Payton, though incompletely and anecdotally.
Less equivocal in opposing the Sindell principle is Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co."
In refusing to apply California law to a diversity case in South Carolina, the federal
court stated the application of the theory "would violate the public policy of this
forum."" The case involved a woman whose mother allegedly took DES in
California in 1954. The plaintiff learned she had developed cancer in 1976. In fil-
ing suit, the plaintiff was unable to identify the manufacturer of the specific harm-
producing DES, and her mother when deposed stated that she could not remember
where the prescription was filled. Six drug companies which allegedly sold DES
in California at the relevant time were named as defendants. The court, however,
declined to become involved in issues of relevant market definition, whether a
substantial percentage of the market was present, or similar issues. Instead, the
court peremptorily dismissed the theory.
Market share liability represents a radical departure from the body of products
liability law that has been developed in South Carolina. By removing the tradi-
tional requirement that the plaintiff identify the responsible manufacturer, the doc-
trine destroys the nexus between production of a defective item and the plaintiff's
injury. As a result, liability is placed on defendants bearing no responsibility for
the defective product.6'
Other cases have similarly taken Sindell to task. Included among these is Starl-
ing v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co.,62 which rejected for theoretical and practical
reasons application of a market share approach to asbestos cases. The court held
that market share liability took a "quantum leap" toward rendering manufacturers
insurers of their products as well as generically similar products of others. This
would violate the policy of Georgia product liability law and could result "in open-
ing a Pandora's box of undesirable economic and social effects. ' 6 3
Payton, 386 Mass. at 574, 437 N.E.2d at 190.
Mizell, 526 F. Supp. 589.
Id. at 596.
61 Id.
62 Starling, 533 F. Supp. 183.
"1 Id. at 190. See the following cases for other rejections of Sindell: Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
514 F. Supp. 1004 (D. S.C. 1981); Tidier v. Eli Lilly & Co., 95 F.R.D. 332 (D. D.C. 1982); Namm
v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (1981); See also supra note 7. It has
also been held that the Sindell principle does not apply where a plaintiff is able to identify at least
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But plaintiffs have enjoyed some success employing either the Sindell principle
itself, or, more often, one of the other theories which the California Supreme Court
rejected in Sindell. Market share liability was advanced by the plaintiff in McElhaney
v. Eli Lilly & Co.," for the usual reasons. That is, the plaintiff was unable to
identify the manufacturer of the DES ingested by her mother, and neither the mother
nor the pharmacist had any "recollection of the color, size or manufacturer of
the DES plaintiff's mother ingested while pregnant with plaintiff. ' 6 The federal
district court quoted approvingly from Sindell and section 433B(3) of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, 66 the provision embodying the rule of Summers v. Tice.
Moreover, the court suggested that despite the fact not all possible tortfeasors were
before the court, the alternative liability principle could attach.67 Like Sindell, there
was emphasis on the consumer's relative ignorance of complex products in the
marketplace and the responsibility of manufacturers in marketing a product which
was insidiously dangerous. The court stopped short, however, of adopting the pure
alternative liability approach of Summers even though "it represent[ed] a reasonable
application of the rationale which supports strict liability." ' 6 Instead, because of
what the court termed the "unusual circumstances ' 69 here, and the fact that the
court believed the defendants to be in a better position to determine who produced
the offending drug, the court held there was "ample justification" for adopting
the Sindell approach.7
McElhaney has few partners, however, in its adoption of the Sindell formula-
tion of market share liability. A New Jersey court in Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co.,"'
applied a type of alternative liability which the California Supreme Court declined
to adopt in Sindell. While in its simplest form, this approach would attach joint
and several liability to all negligent parties unless they could exculpate themselves,"
the New Jersey court added an important qualification. When more than one unex-
culpated party remained, these defendants would be regarded as joint tortfeasors.
However, their liability would be assessed according to New Jersey's Comparative
one manufacturer or supplier whose product caused the injury. Prelick v. Johns-Manville Corp., 531
F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Pa. 1982). Such a holding may provide an incentive to a plaintiff to remain ignorant
of the product manufacturer, so as to be able to use the market share theory.
" McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265 (D. S.D. 1983), aff'd, 739 F.2d 340 (8th Cir.
1984).
, Id. at 268.
66 Id. at 270.
67 Id. This is a departure from Sindell where the court rejected a strict application of Sunners
on the ground that for it to be used fairly all persons who could have been responsible must be before
the court. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 603, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139, 607 P.2d at 931.
6' McElhaney, 564 F. Supp. at 271.
69 Id. Presumably by "unusual circumstances" the court meant only the combination of a plain-
tiff's severe injuries and the identification barrier.
70 Id.
71 Ferrigno, 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305.
72 See supra note 44.
[Vol. 88
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss1/8
MARKET SHARE LIABILITY
Negligence Act." This statute makes the parties liable not for their "prorated"
share, but their "percentage share" of liability.74 The question of how to assess
these percentages remained, but by this point the solution was nearly inevitable.
Sindell could no longer be resisted and the court somewhat begrudgingly acceded
to its logic.
Sindell fashioned a new theory of liability denominated the "share of the market"
liability. Although our cases indicate a preference for joint and several liability,
I find the California approach a reasonable solution to determine the "percentage
share" among unexculpated defendants ...and shall invoke it in this case for
that purpose alone.7
Clearly, the influence of Sindell was substantial and differences between the opera-
tion of its liability assessment and that of Ferrigno's are few, if any material ones
exist whatsoever.
A federal district court decision in California not involving DES has also
followed Sindell.76 In this case, the injury arose out of the plaintiff's reaction to
a diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus vaccine (DPT). The plaintiff alleged that as
a result of the vaccination he suffered irreversible brain damage. As in Sindell,
however, he was unable to identify the manufacturer of the specific vaccine he
was given. Consequently, he sued five pharmaceutical companies that allegedly
"manufactured a substantial share of the DPT vaccine on the market at the time
of. . . injury." '77 The court accepted without question that market share liability
would be an appropriate mechanism to apportion compensatory damages and
focused on the availability of punitive damages in a Sindell-type case. In rejecting
the defendants' arguments against the availability of punitive damages, the court
held that upon establishment of liability under Sindell, and a demonstration of
conscious disregard for human safety by defendants in marketing DPT, punitive
damages would be available. 78
The cases possesses little legal voltage on the adherence to Sindell, however. The
federal court was obliged under the Erie principle to adopt Sindell. Rather than
indicate an increasing acceptance of Sindell, it only reaffirms the complaint of the
manufacturers of generic drugs that they are unfairly treated because they do business
in California.
More significant for various reasons is the recent Michigan case of Abel v.
Eli Lilly & Co.,7 9 a massive action involving 180 plaintiffs and at least sixteen defen-
Ferrigno, 175 N.J. Super. at 572, 420 A.2d at 1316.
Id.
75 Id.
76 Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 573 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
"7 Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1330.
Abel, 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164. The case is a state supreme court case rather than
19851
15
Miller and Hancock: Perspectives on Market Share Liability: Time for a Reassessment
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1985
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
dants. By DES standards the case was otherwise unremarkable. Daughters of women
who ingested DES during pregnancy sued for the damages they suffered as a result
of cancer and other cellular abnormalities produced by DES. Many of these plain-
tiffs were unable to identify the manufacturer of the specific DES prescribed for
their mothers.
The Michigan Supreme Court, in modifying a state court of appeals decision,
found that the plaintiffs had proven enough to escape summary judgment both
on alternative liability and concert of action grounds. It adopted the Summers v.
Tice principle that wrongdoers should not be able to escape liability for an injury
inflicted upon an innocent plaintiff "merely because the nature of their conduct
and the resulting harm has made it difficult or impossible to prove which of them
caused the harm."' 80 The court obviously regarded this principle as paramount,
for it pointed out that "Summers, the polestar case for alternative liability," did
not serve as a "neatly fitting analytical template for application to this case. '",
Indeed. Here there were 180 plaintiffs versus one in Summers, and at least sixteen
defendants versus two in Summers. Moreover, there was a substantial question as
to whether all possible responsible parties were before the court, unlike Summers,
with the defendants asserting that several hundred other manufacturers should have
been in the case. In fact, the court did not relax this standard, for in addition
to requiring the plaintiffs to prove all the defendants acted tortiously and that the
plaintiffs were blameless in not being able to identify the culpable defendant, the
court stated that the plaintiffs "must bring before the court all the actors who
may have caused the injury in fact. ' 82 The court in a footnote did allow for a
possible easing of this "all possible defendants must be joined" principle. 3 Abel
has one other significant factor distinguishing it from Ferrigno. While the latter
applied alternative liability principles to ameliorate the identification problem, it
assessed liability according to market share percentages. This made the case substan-
tially similar to Sindell. Abel on the other hand, permits no such allocation. As
the court stated, "[i]f the defendants are unable to exonerate themselves, joint and
several liability results." 8 This is a difference which will make defendants sit up
and take notice.
a federal court trying to predict state law. Moreover, it permitted plaintiff to avoid summary judgment
on a concert of action theory of recovery.
Abel, 418 Mich. at 327, 343 N.W.2d at 171.
Id. at 329, 343 N.W.2d at 172.
Id. at 331, 343 N.W.2d at 173.
Id. at 331, 343 N.W.2d at n.14. The court quoted approvingly from RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 433B(3):
It is possible that cases may arise in which some modification of the rule stated may be
necessary because of complications arising from the fact that one of the actors involved is
not or cannot be joined as a defendant, or because of the effect of lapse of time, or because
of substantial differences in the character of the conduct of the actors or the risks which
they have created.
But the court stated it was unnecessary to consider the application of this principle to the facts because
of the allegations in the plaintiff's petition.
" Abel, 418 Mich. at 334, 343 N.W.2d at 174.
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While the court's discussion of the concert of action theory was somewhat trun-
cated, it did hold that the plaintiffs had established enough to escape summary
judgment." The plaintiffs satisfied the court that there was sufficient proof to pro-
ceed to trial on claims that the defendants had acted jointly and negligently in
manufacturing and promoting DES and that the drug was inadequately tested and
warned against. With this claim, the identification issue is not of primary impor-
tance. Even if a defendant can establish it did not or could not have produced
the particular offending drug, the concert of action theory still permits liability. 6
It has been fairly well established that the objective of deterring dangerous collec-
tive behavior is vindicated by imposition of liability under these circumstances. The
only other case where the concert of action theory gained judicial acceptance of
any sort is Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co. 7 Due to the Bichler defendants' failure,
however, to preserve error on the issue of whether "conscious parallelism" could
amount to a concert of action, the court's upholding of a jury verdict on a concert
of action count does not carry heavy precedential weight.
B. Collins v. Eli Lilly: An Improvement on Sindell?
At least one court has shown itself to be dissatisfied with the market share
approach to DES cases but has granted plaintiffs what seems to be an even wider
latitude. In Collins v. Eli Lilly,"8 the familiar tragic scenario was present once more.
A DES daughter suffering from full cell cancer of the vagina had to have part
of her uterus, her vagina, and a number of her lymph nodes surgically removed.
Later, the plaintiff's bladder stopped functioning due to this surgery. Likewise,
the familiar DES proof problems were extant: the DES ingested was in generic
form with no identifiable characteristics of shape, color, or markings; during the
relevant time period at least 120 companies marketed DES in a twenty-five milligram
size; records which would reasonably isolate the manufacturer of the DES were
either not kept or were no longer available; and witnesses die even as memories
fade. 89
At an early point in the opinion, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that
the plaintiff was entitled to a remedy. 90 It then examined the theories typically
advanced by plaintiffs in DES cases-alternative liability, concert of action, con-
spiracy, enterprise liability, and, finally, the market share theory. None of these
first four approaches had sufficient appeal to the court, for reasons the court in
Sindell had also found. The market share theory, however, was also found wanting
due to problems of "practical applicability," 9' primarily those relating to establishing
Id. at 337, 343 N.W.2d at 176.
88 Id. See also LaMarca, supra note 27 at 67.
, Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 436 N.E.2d 182 (1982).
Collins, 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37.
I9 d. at 179, 342 N.W.2d at 44.
98 Id. at 182, 342 N.W.2d at 45.
I d. at 189, 342 N.W.2d at 48.
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the appropriate market share. Just as the plaintiff had the next to insurmountable
problem of identifying the maker of the particular offending drug, the defendant
drug companies would be required to produce evidence of market shares when such
records might not be available.92 Even with marginally adequate documentation,
the fact-finder would still have uncertainties caused by market fluidity, though this
to a great extent is part of the overall documentation problem. In short, the court
saw faithful market share allocation to be a "near impossible task" 91 and one not
worth "the waste of judicial resources which would be inherent in a second 'mini-
trial' to determine market share.
' 94
Practical difficulties with the market share approach, however, did not dictate
that the plaintiff go remediless. All the defendants bore a share of the blame for
contributing to the risk of injury to the public and as between the totally blameless
plaintiff and the culpable defendants, it was desirable to place the cost on the drug
manufacturers. They, after all, could best protect against the recurrence of such
injuries by adequate testing, and could pass the loss along to drug consumers.
The court in Collins reduced the burden imposed on plaintiffs by Sindell of
bringing into the case a "substantial share" of the relevant market, to suing but
a single DES manufacturer or marketer. 9 5 So long as plaintiff could establish that
the defendant drug company produced the type of DES taken by the mother, the
plaintiff would be permitted to recover all her damages from the one defendant.9 6
The court encouraged plaintiffs to sue more than one defendant, warning that a
plaintiff suing but one defendant and failing in its case against it may face an ex-
pired statute of limitations as to other defendants, or even in a successful suit,
be confronted with a judgment-proof defendant. As an added effort to fairly allocate
liability, the court also would permit defendants to implead third parties which
produced or marketed the type of DES taken by plaintiff's mother. However, a.
prima facie case can be made against one defendant alone, and total liability can
be imposed on that single company.
At this point the burden is shifted to the defendant or defendants, said the
court. A defendant can escape liability by demonstrating that the DES the mother
ingested could not have been produced by the defendant. That is, either by
establishing that the defendant did not produce or market DES at the pertinent
time or by showing the absence of its product from the appropriate geographic
market, the defendant will avoid being saddled with any liability whatsoever.9 7 This
is, of course, the same result Sindell mandated and is perhaps the best reason to
bring suit against more than one defendant. At the same time, any void in relevant
92 Id.
9I Id.
" Id. at 190, 342 N.W.2d at 49.
91 Id. at 193, 342 N.W.2d at 50.
96 Id.
9, Id. at 197-98, 342 N.W.2d at 52.
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records will result in the defendant or defendants bearing the consequences, that
is, the liability.
Given the court's encouragement to plaintiffs to sue more than one defendant
in such a case, and the rather obvious benefits to doing so, one can expect plain-
tiffs to heed this counsel. With multiple defendants, however, the problem of damage
allocation is raised. That is, if more than one defendant is not able to exculpate
itself, how will the damages found to exist be distributed? The solution lay in the
Wisconsin Comparative Negligence statute. Collins instructs that the fact-finder
will apportion damages based upon "the percentage of causal negligence attributable
to each defendant,"' 8 as the statute directs. The court makes it very clear that this
determination should fall to the fact-finder to resolve. Certainly, the jury is pro-
vided an abundance of criteria to which it can look to apportion liability.99 These
factors are not definitive, for others may be considered if the court in the exercise
of its discretion believes it appropriate.' 0
Collins has raised the judicial ante in the market share sweepstakes, for it per-
mits the focus of liability to rest on one defendant even where an identification
problem is present. Yet before it is regarded as an improvement on the Sindell
approach, several factors should be considered. The court in Collins rejects Sindell
and the "unalloyed market share theory" because it was "limited in practical
applicability." The process of defining the relevant market and allocating market
shares accordingly would be a "nearly impossible task," and the "mini-trial" needed
to resolve this matter would be a wasteful expenditure of judicial resources, reasoned
the court.' 0' Nevertheless, market share percentages were still to be considered as
relevant factors when liability was being apportioned among defendants.'0I Rather
than being the factor, however, as in Sindell, it was but one piece of the puzzle.
Also to be considered are the factors previously noted, such as the role the com-
pany had in gaining FDA approval of DES.
What is gained by this tack? In terms of conserving judicial resources, nothing;
in fact, one can conclude that Collins does not result in a saving of litigation costs,
but an increase. Under Sindell, the practical problems of market definition and
11 Id. at 199, 342 N.W.2d at 53.
91 In assigning a percentage of liability to each defendant, the jury may consider factors which
include, but are not limited to, the following: whether the drug companies conducted tests
on DES for safety and efficacy in use for pregnancies; to what degree the company took
a role in gaining FDA approval of DES for use in pregnancies; whether the company had
a small or large market share in the relevant area; whether the company took the lead or
merely followed the lead of others in producing or marketing DES; whether the company
issued warnings about the dangers of DES; whether the company produced or marketed DES
after it knew or should have known of the possible hazards DES presented to the public;
and whether the company took any affirmative steps to reduce the risk of injury to the public.
Id.
100 Id. at 200, 342 N.W.2d at 53.
101 Id. at 189-90, 342 N.W.2d at 48-49.
"I Id. at 199, 342 N.W.2d at 53.
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allocation are real and, as has been noted in this article, cannot be underestimated.
But in Sindell, at least the focus of the case and all the parties is substantially
on this issue, and on this issue alone. Though potentially substantial, litigation
costs attendant to the resolution of the market share issues are at least confined
to that matter. Collins on the other hand encourages a diffusion of litigation energy
and presentation of proof across a range of issues, including, in all likelihood,
market shares of the defendants. While some defendants will emphasize their minimal
market share holdings, others will be accentuating their relative lack of culpability
in the factual development of the DES tragedy.
Providing jurors with a wealth of factors to consider panoramically may seem
to supply the freedom to give appropriate weight to the factors upon which credible
proof was presented. The litigation costs of such an approach, and the risk of over-
whelming jurors with proof on an excessive number of issues, are substantial. If
the court in Collins genuinely believed the Sindell approach to be objectionable
because it necessitated a "mini-trial" on the market share issue, what it has
substituted is a "maxi-trial," where market share features are included along with
a plethora of other issues.
Collins might be read as not necessarily permitting evidence of market percent-
ages. The court did state that the factors to be considered by the fact-finder would
be within the discretion of the trial court judge.I 3 Presumably, the trial court would
be empowered to exercise this discretion to refuse evidence of market share on
the basis that it would be excessively time-consuming, wasteful, and inconclusive.
Nevertheless, the Collins court did explicitly state one factor for consideration to
be "whether the company had a small or large market share in the relevant area." ' 04
Despite the ambiguity of this statement, one could persuasively argue that the
Wisconsin Supreme Court did intend to allow for market shares to be considered.
Consequently, a trial judge's refusal to permit such evidence would probably con-
stitute an abuse of discretion.
There are several substantial reasons why one or more defendants in such a
case may well want to adduce proof of market share. For example, a small drug
company will certainly emphasize its small percentage of the DES relevant market.
To do otherwise and risk a focus upon the company's participation in the formula-
tion, development, and marketing of DES, when that evidence is unfavorable, would
be a foolish strategy. What about the converse of this situation? That is, will a
drug company with an arguably large percentage of the relevant DES market
necessarily direct its defense to the non-market share issues? In many instances
they would not. Instead, such a defendant might well opt for the tack of attempt-
ing to demonstrate that the properly defined relevant market is one which allocates
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in fewer damages being awarded against that defendant. Such efforts by a defen-
dant might be more productive than centering a defense on a historical chain of
events such as the role the firm took in securing FDA approval of DES."S The
inevitable factual discrepancies which would arise in trying to ascertain the "role"
a drug company played in gaining FDA approval for DES could result in a
historiographic battle of major proportions. Efficiency would be better served by
a drug company defendant trying to narrowly tailor the relevant market to its relative
advantage than to expend its litigation efforts in reconstructing an often uncertain
historical chain of events. The danger of Collins though, is that the defendants will
do both as the evidence suits them, with an attendant focus on those factors tend-
ing to make the other defendants appear more culpable or more of an occupant
of the DES market. In short, the theme of Collins that Sindell's "unalloyed market
share" approach is overly expensive in terms of litigation costs is mistaken. Mistaken,
that is, insofar as the Collins case purports to improve upon it. By suffering from
the same practical problems Sindell endures and by adding more, Collins is hardly
the low-cost alternative to or improvement upon Sindell.'
0 6
"I Collins also noted the defendant's claim that the imposition of liability under such circumstances
would deter research and development.
In their briefs and at oral argument, the defendants contended that imposing liability on
possibly innocent drug companies would discourage drug companies from producing or
marketing generic drugs. It has been argued that society benefits from generic drugs because
they are easier to produce and market and are, therefore, cheaper for the consumer. The
defendants contend that, if liability were imposed on all defendants because the plaintiff can-
not, due to the generic nature of DES, identify the exact producer or marketer, drug com-
panies would seek to avoid future liability by not producing or marketing generic drugs.
While there may be some validity to the defendants' argument, we do not agree
that imposing liability in this case will cause drug companies to cease producing or marketing
generic drugs. We believe that this sort of liability will encourage drug companies to produce
or market safe generic drugs. So long as drug companies properly test drugs and thereby
produce or market a reasonably safe product, they need not fear liability under the rule of
this case. Thus, it is not solely the generic status of the drug but the safety or efficacy of
the drug, generic or otherwise, which may give rise to liability.
Id. at 49-50 n.ll, 342 N.W.2d at 192 n.l1.
"6 Two recent decisions have also followed Sindell, at least in part. A Cook County Illinois trial
court denied the joint motion for summary judgment of DES manufacturers' and adopted the Sindell
case and its reasoning. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 80-L-20473 (Ill. Cir. Dec. Oct. 10, 1984).
In Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984), the Washington Supreme
Court held that precise identification of the manufacturer in a DES case was not necessary. However,
it did not adopt Sindell's solution to the problem, but a modification of the market share theory.
Plaintiff was relieved of the obligation to join a substantial percentage of the market and need
sue only one manufacturer. Likewise, plaintiff need not establish the temporal or geographic relevant
market. Manufacturers unable to exculpate themselves by showing they could not have produced the
particular offending drug are presumed to have equal shares of that market and are liable for damages
only to the extent of that presumptive share. The presumption can be rebutted by establishing their
market share of DES in the plaintiff's particular geographic market. The presumed market shares will
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V. MARKET SHAu LIAnITY: QUESTIONS AND COSTS
As has been set forth, arguments against the imposition of market share liability
range from the practical to the economic. The most persistent criticism of Sindell
is that it was imprecise and left uncertain how the market share theory of recovery
would be implemented. This is not an irremediable problem, however. Many judicial
opinions that stake out new liability ground leave the details of the workings of the
claim to subsequent judicial decision, or perhaps to legislation.0 7
The court in Sindell was mistaken to assert that issues relating to market share
definition and share allocation were matters of proof. In fact, they are issues cen-
tral to the implementation of the market share theory which should have been
addressed by the court at that time, if only to set out some preliminary guideposts.
Likewise, the court erred by not specifying what would constitute a "substantial
percentage" of the market. This was an issue important enough for the court to
make a ruling on at the time. These failings, however, do not themselves under-
mine the legitimacy of the market share doctrine, only the forcefulness of that par-
ticular court's opinion. Later opinions can address with specificity how the rele-
vant geographic market is to be defined; whether a plaintiff joining producers of
eighty percent of the market recovers only eighty percent of his damages or one
hundred percent, with the defendants having the remaining twenty percent reallocated
among them; 08 and whether a set figure for "substantial percentage" should be
established.'0 9 These and other problems can all be addressed in later opinions or
legislatively." 0 Consequently, courts should not reject the Sindell approach on this
basis.
One criticism of Sindell and the market share theory is more fundamental and
cuts to the essence of its advisability, however. Drug companies have claimed, and
some courts have accepted as real, the argument that market share liability will
substantialiy dampen the incentive of drug companies to expend funds for the
research and development of new drugs. That is to say, if drug companies are going
A good example of this in the tort context is comparative negligence. In some instances, com-
parative negligence is adopted judicially. When a state supreme court embraces comparative negligence,
it may do so in a decision indicating only that the doctrine of contributory negligence will no longer
serve as a complete bar to recovery, but only a partial defense. See, e.g., Goetzman v. Wichern, 327
N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982). Such a decision leaves significant issues unresolved. For example, is com-
parative fault also to be used between or among defendants? Does the common law doctrine of joint
and several liability still retain its validity? Such issues are of critical importance to future litigants,
but may still be reserved for subsequent decision. The common law process can put flesh on the doc-
trine in an accretive and definitional way. Or the legislature in a state may react to a decision and
develop comprehensive legislation in the field. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 668.1-668.10 (West 1984)
(Iowa statutes establishing structure for comparative fault cases).
,O, See supra text accompanying notes 47-49. A good discussion of this problem is in Fischer,
supra note 43, at 1642-50. See also Copeland, 447 So.2d at 914.
,' See Fischer, supra note 43; Newcomb, supra note 43.
"0 As discussed in note 51, the Kasten bill (S. 44) at one point addressed the problem of cases
where plaintiffs were unable to identify the manufacturers of the precise injury-producing drug.
[Vol. 88
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to be saddled with liability in situations where they may not have even produced
the particular offending drug, they will be reluctant to enter or create new drug
markets. This redounds to the detriment of society and consequently should be
considered carefully.
Because of these concerns, it is prudent to focus on the impact of market share
liability on the pharmaceutical industry. Market share liability is not a ubiquitous
replacement for more traditional product liability theories but rather an alternative
to be employed only under certain circumstances. Those circumstances, as iden-
tified by Sindell, arise whenever the cost to the plaintiff of identifying the culpable
producer would, under these more traditional approaches, preclude compensation.'
If each firm's liability is identical under either the market share theory or conven-
tional theories, its behavior will not be affected by substituting the former for any
of the latter.' 2 There is, however, strong support for the conclusion that liability
exposure will differ. Since alternative liability rules may not, in general, be expected
to produce identical incentive structures, an investigation into the nature and
significance of the noted discrepancy may prove beneficial in evaluating the propriety
of adopting market share liability.
A. Incentives and Free Riders
The fundamental difference between market share liability and more traditional
product liability theories lies in the fact that the former provides a socialization
(among market participants) of costs of consumer injury. The effect of such a
liability rule is to create what is known as the "free rider" problem. The free rider
problem arises whenever the gains accruing from individual expenditures are
distributed among many-the gains in this instance taking the form of reduced
injury liability.
A free enterprise system, with its emphasis on autonomous economic agents
seeking individual profit maximization, is ill suited to the provision of the socially
optimal amount of goods with free rider aspects. Consider, for example, landowners
who must contend with annual flooding. Assuming that the construction of a dam
would eliminate the flooding, all affected landowners have an incentive equal to
the resulting increment in land productivity to contribute to the building of the
dam. At the same time, however, each has an incentive to minimize his contribu-
tion to the project-for each one realizes that once the dam is built the benefits
" The costs in such a case are the costs of identifying the manufacturer of the specific harm-
producing drug.
"2 This result follows from the assumption implicit in analysis of firm behavior responding to
profit motive. If alternative liability rules produce identical costs for alternative types of activity, there
will be no incentive on the part of firms seeking to maximize profits to change any level of activity,
like safety expenditures, which would affect liability exposure. For if a set of actions maximizes profit
under one liability rule, the same result would follow from the same set of actions under any other
liability rule generating the same cost structure.
1985]
23
Miller and Hancock: Perspectives on Market Share Liability: Time for a Reassessment
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1985
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
will accrue to all affected land owners regardless of their contribution. The same
analysis applies to the pharmaceutical industry under market share liability. The
expenditure on production and other controls which enhance product safety will
result in fewer and less costly injuries. This benefit will be distributed among industry
members in the form of reduced liability awards. But the expenditure which reduced
the liability of all is concentrated within the individual firm. As a result, the firm
has less incentive to promote product safety than if it alone received the total
benefits.
The free rider discussion can be more generally framed as the obverse of the
now-famous problem of social cost discussed by Ronald Coase.' I3 The fundamental
distinction between Coase's social cost examples and the free rider problem stems
from the nature of the effects visited upon others as a result of individual decisions
and consequent actions. Coase focused primarily upon those instances involving
property losses to others, e.g., crop damage from sparks emitted by passing trains.
But precisely the same impediment to achieving socially optimal results arises
whenever the gains from individual expenditures are not entirely appropriable by
the decisionmaker. Because the gains are "externalized," the activity creates social
value beyond that realized by the decisionmaker, and insufficient incentives will
exist for individuals to provide the socially optimal level of expenditure for that
activity.
An important similarity between the free rider and social cost problem exists
in that there is an incentive equal to the net social gain generated by the activity
for autonomous economic agents to negotiate a resolution. In the flooding example
previously mentioned, each landowner will have an incentive to see that the dam
is built equal to the increased land value which the dam would generate for him.
Thus, the free market may, through the exchange process, resolve the problem of
either "externalized" gains or costs, and consequently provide the socially optimal
outcome. Whether or not the problem is resolved by autonomous contracting agents,
as perceptively noted by Coase, hinges upon the costs to the affected parties of
engaging in and negotiating the exchange-that is, the transactions costs. If the
net gains fall short of the transactions costs incurred in the process of internalizing
them, the market will fail to provide incentives for their production. If this failure
occurs, the remedy must be sought from other possible alternatives which will replace
a purely market directed solution-alternatives which typically involve some form
of governmental intervention." In an effort to establish whether or not the market
requires such intervention, we consider more directly the free rider aspects engendered
by market share liability within the pharmaceutical industry.
'" Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
' Some alternatives concerning governmental resolution of the market share problem are con-
sidered in Comment, Market Share Liability: A Plea for Legislative Alternatives, 1982 U. ILL. L. F. 1003.
[Vol. 88
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B. Substantial Share Bias
Rather than requiring the plaintiff to establish a causal link between the injurious
product and the specific producer of that product, market share liability requires,
in this regard, only that an injurious product be causally linked to a "substantial
share" of a market supplied by certain producers. Implicit in the substantial share
standard is the court's recognition that some culpable producers may escape
liability."' If market share liability is consistently biased, however, the free rider
problem will become more acute as some firms will have even less incentive to
increase safety expenditures. But does such a systematic bias in market share liability
exist? The answer is provided by the substantial share standard itself.
The view of Sindell adopted by many legal commentators is that something
around seventy-five percent of the relevant market will satisfy the substantial share
standard." '6 Accepting this proferred percentage as the minimum threshold
necessarily implies that the omission of any firm with a market share in excess
of twenty-five percent will be fatal to the plaintiff's case. If, as alleged in Sindell,
the named defendants represented approximately ninety percent of the market, it
must follow that no firm with a market share in excess of ten percent was omitted.
Yet the opinion states that of the 200 possible defendants in Sindell only five re-
mained at the appeal stage. ",7 To constitute ninety percent of the market, the defen-
dants still in the case on appeal must have been large concerns, while the remaining
195, or so, must certainly have been small. It seems apparent then that the bias
engendered by the substantial share rule is systematically in favor of the small
producer.
It may be further argued that once the substantial share threshold has been
established there is little incentive for the plaintiff to join additional producers.
Though Sindell is silent on this point, its tenor suggests that a plaintiff would be
permitted to recover one hundred percent of his damages once a substantial percent-
age of the market was in the case. That is, even if only ninety percent of the market
was in the case, plaintiff could recover all damages established with the remaining
percentage in some way reallocated among defendants. If total compensation is
allowed the plaintiff naming five defendants with ninety percent of the market,
as alleged in Sindell, where is the incentive for plaintiff to expend added resources
to identify the remaining unnamed defendants?" 8 There is none, for the marginal
"' This point was recognized in the Sindell court's discussion and rejection of the use of alter-
native liability. The court stated that "there [was] no rational basis upon which to infer that any defen-
dant in this action caused plaintiffs injuries, nor even a reasonable possibility that they were respon-
sible." Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 603, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139, 607 P.2d at 931.
116 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 20 at 996; Stewart, Beyond Enterprise Liability in DES Cases-
Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 14 IND. L. REv. 695, 720 (1981).
Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 596, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134, 607 P.2d at 926.
"' Sindell does allow for named defendants to bring in other drug manufacturers who might have
produced the particular injurious drug. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145, 607 P.2d at 937.
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gain of identifying additional defendants is zero while the marginal cost is surely
positive and inversely related to the size of the firm. Wealth maximizing plaintiffs
will therefore name the largest manufacturers to satisfy the enunciated judicial stan-
dard, and omit the smallest to minimize cost."I9 The repercussions of this systematic
bias is that small firms can benefit as free riders and thus face reduced incentives
to produce safe products. The magnitude of this predicted effect may be evaluated
by considering patented and unpatented drugs sequentially.
1. Patented Drugs
Most pharmaceuticals produced under patent should be entirely unaffected by
the imposition of market share liability. Because identification costs will be insignifi-
cant, there will be no need to impose market share liability. If there is but one
producer, the patent holder, the plaintiff will not encounter any obstacle to
establishing a causal link between injurious product and producer-the entirejustification for the emergence of the market share rule.' 0 Patented drugs which
are produced under license, however, will not be as immune from the effects of
market share liability.
Patents are granted to firms successful in the development and testing of new
chemical entities. As some commentators have suggested, the scale economies
inherent in research and development preclude all but the largest of firms from
this activity."'2 Consequently, most patents are granted to firms which are nationally
recognized as industry leaders-that is, large firms. As discussed above, these are
precisely the firms which are consistently put at a disadvantage by market share
liability. If the patent holder perceives the added exposure to liability resulting from
the possible imposition of market share liability to be in excess of the gains from
leasing the patent rights, it will choose to retain those rights and thereby avoid
the added liability. As a result, the adoption of the market share theory may well
lead to a reduction of the number of patent leases in this field of pharmaceuticals.
Market share liability need not, however, lead to an elimination of all leased
patents. Other alternatives are available to the patent holder and lessee because
of their contractual relationship. Any redistribution of risk, whether biased or entirely
,,' Of course plaintiffs would have an incentive to sue other companies if courts limited damage
recovery to the corresponding percentage of the market they brought before the court.
"I0 This conclusion is based on the assumption that the patent pertains to a new chemical entity
for which there are no therapeutic equivalents. Eliminating the identification costs precludes imposition
of market share liability. Identification costs may become important if a competing firm develops a
therapeutically equivalent but chemically distinct, therefore patentable, new drug. Then, an identifica-
tion problem could re-emerge if a prescription is written for a generic class and the pharmacist supplies
either. As the risk of liability exposure rises on any patented drug with competing patented substitutes,
the expected returns from research and development would be expected to diminish.
, ' See D. SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 11, at 307.
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random, occasioned by market share liability may be contractually neutralized by
adjusting the terms of the contract under which the patent rights are leased.' 22 The
contract may specify that the lessees maintain detailed records-perhaps to the extent
of recording each consumer's purchases, with an indemnity provision if the lessee
fails to do this and the lessor has to pay damages in a market share situation.
Alternatively, production standards may be imposed on lessees to guarantee con-
sistency of product safety between producers. Moreover, to the extent there is any
geographic division of the market, firms could retain full liability for their specific
market. These are but three of an infinite number of alternatives which patent
holders and lessees may agree upon to ameliorate the deleterious and often
unpredictable effects of market share liability. The alternative which in fact emerges
will be determined by the cost of negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing each of
the alternatives. In the event that these costs exceed all possible gains from con-
tracting, the product will be produced solely by the patent holder. Factors anticipated
to be of importance in the determination of these costs would seem to include such
things as interfirm knowledge of quality control adherence, technical aspects of
the production process such as production tolerances and costs of detecting defects,
as well as the past history of the inherent safety of the drug in question. The evidence
suggests that the majority of patented drugs are not produced under license. As
one author states:
The top fifteen companies by sales in 1970 obtained 68.5 percent of all of the patents
granted during the period 1941-71 on marketed drugs, and they issued 71.1 percent
of all licenses. It is true that they issued only 186 licenses on 354 patented products,
and on more than half of the patents, no licenses were granted at all. 23
After an analysis of the facts, the same author is forced to conclude:
Owners of patents usually have issued few licenses. A large pharmaceutical com-
pany will issue licenses to other manufacturers when they have through their own
research efforts established patent positions which threaten infringement suits. In
addition, licenses may be granted in exchange for technical information and cross
licenses. In addition, large foreign firms, or small domestic firms which have lacked
marketing organizations have granted licenses. 24
In light of the licensing patterns of the pharmaceutical industry extant prior to
the Sindell decision, the imposition of market share liability should not significantly
alter production and market characteristics of patented drugs. Related to this factor
is the anticipated effect on the incentive for research and development of new drugs.
Successful research and development will lead to patent rights which generate
a future stream of income for the patent holder. As discussed above, these returns
"I See Cheung, Transactions Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements,
9 J. oF LAW AND EcoN. (1969), for a discussion of these opportunities.
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can, be insulated from the adverse effects of market share liability by the firm's
decision not to lease the rights of the patent. As noted by David Schwartzman,
over half of all patents granted between 1941 and 1971 were not leased.' Conse-
quently, the returns from the patent rights on these pharmaceuticals will be unaf-
fected and no adverse effect on research and development should result. For the
remaining drugs produced under patent lease, the returns to the lessor may be
mitigated by either the increased transactions costs borne by the patent holder or,
in those instances where transactions costs preclude the lease, by the reduced income
resulting from the absence of royalty payments. Thus, the returns to research and
development will be affected to the extent that the net gains from the proceeds
of leasing are reduced by transactions costs. But, since the proportion of patents
leased has not been even a majority of the total patent market, the incentives to
invest in the development of new drugs should not be significantly affected.,"6
2. Unpatented Drugs
The unpatented drug market is a significant and increasing portion of the entire
drug industry both as a fraction of prescriptions written as well as in terms of
total revenue. Out of all prescriptions written for leading drugs in 1972, unpatented
drugs accounted for forty-four percent of the
market. This proportion has been rising since 1972. '27 Measured in terms of total
industry revenue, available data again presents evidence of the increasing impor-
125 Id.
,21 Despite the emergence of the market share theory, research and development has flourished
among pharmaceutical firms. "This year, despite their profit worries, many [drug companies] have
approved double-digit increases in R & D spending, pushing it to record levels. Werck's budget increased
more than 12%, to $500 million. Smith Kline Beckman Corp.'s rose 10.7% to $293 million." Prescrip-
tion Drugmakers Try to Cope with a Dose of Adversity, Bus. WK., Sept. 17, 1984, at 132.
127 TABLE 1
Prescriptions in 1972 of Leading Drugs






Source: D. SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 11, at 109, Table 6-5.
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tance of unpatented drugs. One source suggests that unpatented drugs have risen
from thirty-five percent of leading drug sales in 1972 to sixty-nine percent in 1980.128
The risk of exaggerating the effects of market share liability would not be entirely
eliminated even if accurate data on the unpatented market were available. Because
many unpatented drugs were initially produced under patent, the industry will have
an accumulation of information upon which to assess their safety. Since the life
of an average patent extends for 12.4 years, 2 9 a substantial history will be available
and will enable prospective producers to categorize drugs as either relatively safe
or risky. The former type of drug will be any which has an insignificant probability
of creating injuries sufficient to warrant a liability suit. For such drugs, market
share liability will have faint, if any, effect. The absence of anticipated injury con-
siderably lessens exposure to liability-market share or otherwise.
Other drugs will be perceived as relatively risky in that the likelihood of future
liability is significant. Only in this submarket of unpatented drugs will market share
liability apply. Risk may arise either because the drug is new and information suf-
ficient to evaluate its safety is unavailable or because its history has proven the
drug to be unsafe. DES provides an example of the former category. After Sindell,
drugs used by pregnant women will certainly be scrutinized. Whenever a drug is
peceived to be risky, firms will weigh possible exposure to market share liability
when deciding whether to produce the drug in question.
128 TABLE 2
Sales in 1972 of Leading Drugs Not






Source: D. SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 11 at 108, Table 6-4.
However, the relative magnitude of the unpatented drug market is overstated by these figures. While
the market share for 1972 is based upon actual data, that of 1975 and 1980 are projections based upon
the simplifying, but dubious, assumption that no patents, beyond those extant in 1972, would be granted.
Since no new patents are admitted to the model, the expiration of patents over time must, of necessity,
increase the share of unpatented drugs in the market. The information in Tables 1 and 2, then, must
be viewed with this in mind.
129 See D. SciwArzMAN, supra note 11, at 11.
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These so-called "risky" unpatented drugs are more vulnerable to the effects
of market share liability due to the absence of a central contracting agent. The
absence of a central contractor may be expected to produce significant barriers
to establishing contractual provisions which modify the liability distribution created
by market share liability. Transaction costs would be especially important when
there are numerous market participants-precisely the conditions under which market
share liability is most likely to be imposed, as Sindell illustrates. If, due to transac-
tion costs, liability distribution cannot be contractually modified, firm behavior
will be subjected to the new constraints imposed by market share liability. As a
result, each firm will be free to decide its own profit maximizing level of safety
expenditures. Since this decision will be made based on the gains and costs which
it alone faces, the "free rider" aspect of allocating damages among market
participants as envisioned by some commentators becomes apparent. 3 '
Market share liability effectively disperses the gains from each firm's expen-
ditures on safety to all market participants. Any expenditure on safety by a single
manufacturer will reduce injury liability for all firms in the industry. Each firm
will receive a benefit equal to the foregone damages multiplied by the market share
for which it would otherwise have been held liable. As eloquently demonstrated
by Guido Calabresi, this will not promote socially optimal safety expenditures.''
Since the marginal dollar expended on safety returns only a fraction of the value
of resulting total injury damages foregone, profit maximizing firms will find it in
their interest to reduce the level of expenditures on safety if there are no less costly
alternatives available to them.
This reduction in safety expenditures by firms could create the result of greater
injuries among the consumers of drugs produced within the unpatented drug market.
The added injuries and subsequent liability claims will reduce profitability within
the industry and possibly lead to an exit of many producers. Especially hard hit
will be those producers which it has been shown market share liability discriminates
against-that is, the larger producers. The ultimate effects of this scenario are
difficult to predict but the costs, both in terms of consumer injury and resource
misallocation, can surely be imagined as substantial. It is not unreasonable then
to posit the existence of market alternatives which will evolve to limit such a digres-
sion within the industry.
One alternative suggested within the Sindell decision itself is for firms to
exculpate themselves by proving the absence of their product from the relevant
market. Any pharmaceutical manufacturer will be able to limit the exposure to
liability by maintaining more complete and accurate records of the markets which
it supplies. Given existing industry practices in documenting product batch lot
numbers it is not unreasonable to assume that additional record keeping would
See, e.g., Newcomb, supra note 43, at 317-18.
'' Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
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be a viable alternative.' 32 With the current technological advances in information
processing the cost of such analternative should not be prohibitive, and further-
more, these costs can be expected to diminish as technology improves. Indeed, the
free rider effects noted above could be entirely eliminated if records were detailed
to the point of identifying individual consumer purchases. With such records no
producer would be held liable for injuries resulting from another firm's lax adherence
to safety standards. Market share liability would then adversely affect only those
firms with insufficient documentation to exculpate themselves. The existence of
complete consumer records would effectively provide the information which was
previously absent and eliminate the fundamental justification for imposing market
share liability.
Whether or not this suggested alternative is in fact employed by the phar-
maceutical industry hinges on its cost relative to other possible solutions, of which
there are an infinite number. As noted, some pharmaceuticals may have an extended
history as a relatively safe drug producer and not be considered by the industry
to be a candidate for liability suits. For such drugs the producers may feel confi-
dent that records need not be maintained. But for any product with an uncertain
history or a-history indicative of potentially significant injury, market information
will have value.
Thus, market share liability should have a minimal effect on the market for
unlicensed patented drugs. While market share liability may preclude some pro-
ducts from being licensed, its effect on licensed patented drugs and on research
and development efforts is predicted to be small. The most significant impact is
predicted to be on product safety in the market for unpatented drugs. Even with
this, there are means available for dealing with this problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
One could argue persuasively that the effect of Sindell has been overrated. While
viewed as a harbinger of doom by the drug industry, it is well to bear in mind
what the plaintiff confronts even after being granted the relaxed identification rule
of Sindell. Under market share theory, the plaintiff must still establish wrongful
conduct by the defendant-that is, the breach of a legally recognizable duty. 33
This would include a showing that DES does cause cancer.' 3' Furthermore, under
"S Medwick, Quality-Control Education in the College of Pharmacy, in QUAITY CONTROL IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, (M.S. Cooper ed. 1972).
"I In Sindell, the plaintiff's allegations sounded in negligence, strict liability, and a variety of
other claims. For a negligence claim, the plaintiff would have to establish that defendants knew or
should have known of the unreasonable risk presented by the DES while the strict liability count would
focus on the defective nature of the product itself.
" Plaintiffs in such a case would customarily attempt to establish a statistically significant link
between DES use and genital tract cancer in users' daughters. Two of the more commonly cited references
in support of such a claim are Nordquist, Fidler, Woodruff & Lewis, Clear Cell Adenocarcinoma of
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Sindell, the plaintiff must still join a substantial percentage of the market. The
cost and perceived unfairness of this requirement has caused some courts recently
to reject this and permit the plaintiff to sue but one responsible defendant.'", Viewed
in this light, Sindell offers defendants considerable insulation from cases where
plaintiffs actually recover damages.
Nevertheless, Sindell is a case drug companies must take seriously. Since the
FDA permitted DES to be used as an anti-miscarriage drug until 1971, future cases
can be expected. For courts to reject market share liability as "unfair, unworkable
and contrary to ... law," 3 6 without assessing its application and costs completely
seems mistaken. While the court in Sindell may be justly criticized for much of
the indefiniteness of the decision, this tack was not wholly unjustified. Given the
fact that proof in these cases would be so varied and dependent upon what was
available, the court may have been acting wisely in not trying to specify the
particulars of this nascent claim.
By being intentionally general, the court permits the common law process to
function. The cool response given Sindell by other courts and the absence of subse-
quent elaboration by the California Supreme Court, however, has not done much
to advance the exegesis. As has been demonstrated, however, the spirit of Sindell,
if not the letter, has found a place in other cases.
Finally, this article posits that many of the practical problems of the market
share approach are resolvable and the economic objections somewhat overstated.
As courts struggle with future cases of generic, interchangeable drugs, it may well
be that Sindell's bold stroke will be looked upon more kindly.
the Cervix and Vagina, 37 CANCER 858 (1976), and Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer, Adenocarcinoma
of the Vagina: Association of Maternal Stilbestrol Therapy with Tumor Appearance in Young Women,
284 NEw ENG. J. MED. 878 (1971).
'3 See, e.g., Collins, 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37. See supra text accompanying notes 88-105
and Martin, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368.
'36 Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 246.
[Vol. 88
32
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss1/8
